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Abstract
In his classic study, The Arab Cold War, Malcolm Kerr charted the machinations of inter-Arab politics during an 
era dominated by Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In another renowned work, The Struggle for Syria, 
Patrick Seale documented the links between Syria’s tumultuous domestic politics and the broader contest for 
supremacy in the region, stemming from factors ranging from inter-Arab conflicts to the global cold war. Today, 
amid the chaos in Syria and the transformations in the region, these texts, both originally published in 1965, seem 
all too contemporary. Once again, regional politics shows many signs of an Arab cold war and, once again, that 
broader conflict is manifesting itself in a struggle for Syria. In the Arab cold war of the 1950s and 1960s, inter-
Arab relations were characterized by power struggles between “revolutionary” republics, led by pan-Arab 
nationalist military officers, and more conservative or even reactionary monarchies. The republics saw themselves 
as the future of Arab politics, with the aim of changing not only the type of regime in Arab states, but also the 
map of the region through repeated unification efforts. This pan-Arab project led to extensive intervention in the 
affairs of various states, by both sides, as the republics and monarchies waged proxy wars in civil conflicts in 
Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere. Many of the same elements - power struggles, ideological and identity 
conflicts, and proxy wars - are present today. The main difference is that the 2012 version of the Arab cold war 
does not array revolutionary republics on one side. Over time, the radical republics of the 1950s and 1960s 
became deep-seated authoritarian states, neither revolutionary nor particularly republican. Many of them have 
now experienced actual national revolutions, as opposed to the military coups of past decades that tended to be 
cast as “revolutions.” On the other hand, the greatest similarity to the earlier cold war is the mobilization of 
conservative monarchies attempting to block another wave of change across the Arab regional system.
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In his classic study, The Arab Cold War, Malcolm Kerr charted the machinations of inter-Arab politics during an era dominated by Egypt’s
President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In another renowned work, The Struggle for Syria, Patrick Seale documented the links between Syria’s
tumultuous domestic politics and the broader contest for supremacy in the region, stemming from factors ranging from inter-Arab
con icts to the global cold war. [1] Today, amid the chaos in Syria and the transformations in the region, these texts, both originally
published in 1965, seem all too contemporary. Once again, regional politics shows many signs of an Arab cold war and, once again, that
broader con ict is manifesting itself in a struggle for Syria.
In the Arab cold war of the 1950s and 1960s, inter-Arab relations were characterized by power struggles between “revolutionary”
republics, led by pan-Arab nationalist military o cers, and more conservative or even reactionary monarchies. The republics saw
themselves as the future of Arab politics, with the aim of changing not only the type of regime in Arab states, but also the map of the
region through repeated uni cation e orts. This pan-Arab project led to extensive intervention in the a airs of various states, by both
sides, as the republics and monarchies waged proxy wars in civil con icts in Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere.
Many of the same elements — power struggles, ideological and identity con icts, and proxy wars — are present today. The main
di erence is that the 2012 version of the Arab cold war does not array revolutionary republics on one side. Over time, the radical
republics of the 1950s and 1960s became deep-seated authoritarian states, neither revolutionary nor particularly republican. Many of
them have now experienced actual national revolutions, as opposed to the military coups of past decades that tended to be cast as
“revolutions.” On the other hand, the greatest similarity to the earlier cold war is the mobilization of conservative monarchies
attempting to block another wave of change across the Arab regional system.
As the monarchical regimes increasingly cooperate in self-defense, the question is: Against what? Until the 2011 uprisings, the answer
seemed to be the non-Arab threat of Iran. Many Arab regimes were concerned not only with Iranian power, but also with Iranian
in uence and interference in Arab politics. Arab con icts from Iraq to Lebanon were viewed increasingly in both power politics and
sectarian terms: as proxy battles between Saudi- and Iranian-led blocs in the regional balance of power and also as struggles between
Sunni and Shi‘i alliances in the greater Middle East.
The  rst signs of the new Arab cold war predate the Arab uprisings of 2011-2012, and became especially clear during the 2006 war
between Israel and Hizballah. [2] Some Arab states chose to view this Arab-Israeli war, unlike all previous ones, in sectarian terms. While
Arab states did not support Israel in the con ict, few rose to the defense, even verbally, of the Iranian-backed Shi‘i organization in
Lebanon. Yet the 2006 con ict signaled another key shift that was perhaps a harbinger of events in 2011: the clear rift in many Arab
countries between state and society. Arab governments (aside from Syria) may not have supported Hizballah, but many Arab publics
did. Arab street demonstrations made the link to the earlier Arab cold war period, with placards comparing Nasser in 1956 to Hizballah
leader Hasan Nasrallah in 2006. But as André Bank and Morten Valbjørn have noted, this comparison only underscored the di erences
between the two eras. Nasser was a head of state, with a secular, avowedly socialist approach to pan-Arabism. Nasrallah is head of a
mass movement with an Islamist approach to Arabism and Arab identity. Bank and Valbjørn argue further that the di erences make
clear the shift in the meaning of pan-Arabism itself, from an ideology of struggle used by secular states to a “new societal Islamic
Political Arabism.” In their formulation:
A societal Political Arabism rising from an Arab-Islamic public rather than a state-led Pan-Arabism constitutes a dominant frame of reference in
Middle East regional politics today. Societal actors, not upstart republics, now represent the challenge to the regional status quo. The rivalry is also
no longer primarily an inter-state competition, but a cold war between Arab regimes and societal actors led by Islamists with considerable popular
support and subscribing to a popularly driven Islamic Political Arabism. [3]
Failure to grasp the continuing importance of Arabism, and its changing form, led many outside observers to miss key dynamics in
regional politics. F. Gregory Gause has argued that this interpretive lapse caused most scholars of the Middle East to miss the hints of
the Arab uprisings. [4] Scholarship had too often treated pan-Arabism as long dead, missing its continuing salience at the social level
and hence at the political level as well. [5]
Today, states, societies and social movements struggle over the meaning of pan-Arab identity. Unlike the Arabism of the earlier Arab
cold war, the modern version does not emphasize redrawing borders and revamping governments through uni cation schemes.
Rather, the new struggle more often involves con icts within domestic politics, sometimes with a dimension of external intercession.
Hence, there are multiple levels of meaning in inter-Arab struggles: Conservative monarchies rediscover the importance of Arab unity
as a language of mutual protection from regime change; Arab Islamist movements challenge regimes and connect with peers across
borders; and pro- and anti-democratization forces work not only within states, but also across states, in their attempts at collaboration.
The Arab uprisings of 2011-2012 have deepened the divisions of the new Arab cold war, including along Sunni-Shi‘i lines. And like the
earlier cold war, the contemporary one features competing approaches to intervention in the a airs of other Arab states. But the
current version, while displaying sectarian and power dimensions, also includes new dynamics emerging from the Arab uprisings
themselves. Today’s Arab cold war features not only state-state rivalries, but also state-society con icts characterized by reemergent
Arab identity politics, a public sphere expanded by a revolution in media and communication, a rise of Islamist social and political
movements challenging incumbent regimes and,  nally, new norms and popular expectations regarding participation in public life.
These dynamics have led to a reassertion of foreign policy activism on the part of conservative monarchies, to the point that one of the
most active forces in regional politics today, somewhat amazingly, is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC is no military
juggernaut, but has risen to prominence because the uprisings came at a time when the three traditional (and often rival) power
centers — Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus — had all receded from the regional balance of power. Each state was overwhelmed with
domestic concerns: Egypt with its own revolution, Iraq with the e ects of US invasion and occupation, and Syria with its own uprising.
Domestic unrest and insecurity had forced the regimes in Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus to cede the stage to Riyadh and, more
surprisingly, to Doha. These changes in regional dynamics have had important e ects for uprisings in Yemen, Libya, Bahrain and now
Syria. And this time, there is no countervailing force to check the conservative monarchies…unless it comes from the people under
their rule.
The Saudis and other GCC regimes were so alarmed at regional trends that they reached out to decidedly non-Gulf kingdoms, in
Morocco and Jordan, inviting them to join the council. Morocco showed limited interest in joining the faraway alliance, while Jordan
scrambled to revive an application that had been on the table for 20 years. [6] It is still unclear if any expansion will occur. The GCC
remains, in any case, an alliance of conservative Arab and Sunni hereditary monarchies, this time not against radical Arab republics or
even Iranian revolutionaries, but against the restive peoples within their own borders. While not inviting Yemen to join, the GCC did
attempt to dampen the  res there by brokering deals to trade partial regime change for an end to unrest. Still, despite Saudi e orts to
use the GCC as its main tool in a regional counter-revolution, other GCC states often break with Riyadh and maintain de antly
independent foreign policies. Despite the bilateral Saudi-Iranian cold war, for instance, Oman and Qatar have each maintained cordial
relations with Tehran. [7]
The rise of Qatar to at least temporary status as a regional “power” is perhaps the oddest phenomenon in contemporary inter-Arab
relations. The tiny but immensely wealthy peninsular monarchy has steadily enhanced its regional and even global role, from hosting
rounds of World Trade Organization negotiations in 2001 to landing the World Cup scheduled for 2022. Qatar is also home to the
in uential Al Jazeera satellite news channel, which has provided exhaustive coverage of most of the Arab uprisings. The Gulf emirate has
also positioned itself as broker of peace in con icts between factions in Lebanon, Palestine and even Afghanistan, with the Taliban
opening an o ce in Doha.
When the Libyan uprising began, Qatar led the call for international intervention. When the wave of revolt reached Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia led the counter-revolution and the GCC intervened militarily to support the Bahraini monarchy against pro-democracy and pro-
reform demonstrators. Echoing the sectarian logic of 2006, the intervention was framed as Sunni solidarity against Shi‘i (and allegedly
Iranian) subversion.
While the Libyan revolution led to civil war and outside intervention, including an extended NATO campaign of air strikes against the
Qadda  regime, the Syrian uprising threatens to take an even more dangerous path, both for the Syrian people and the region as a
whole. The Syrian crisis began as part of the Arab uprisings, with civilian activists marching for greater freedom and openness in Syria. It
was only after the regime responded with violence in Dir‘a that protest movements sprang up across the country. These movements,
too, began peacefully but were met with force. Eventually, calls for reform became calls for regime change. The Arab League plan asking
President Bashar al-Asad to cede power to a deputy was crafted under Qatar’s temporary (rotating) leadership of the Arab League
council, with strong GCC support. Indeed, the idea of Arab League monitors in Syria had a similar genesis, and the GCC states were
accordingly the  rst to withdraw their monitors in early February (followed closely by GCC aspirant Jordan) when they deemed the
mission a failure.
The Syrian imbroglio bears all the hallmarks of the new Arab cold war, including domestic struggle between a regime and opposition
each with outside patrons, attempts to fan the  ames of sectarianism, and dueling narratives regarding who is really attacking whom.
Like the earlier Arab cold war, the con ict is awash in propaganda and disinformation. Even honest media attempts to understand the
Syrian revolution too often distill the con ict to a ruthless regime versus the Syrian National Council (a collection of opposition groups
in exile) and the Free Syria Army (a relatively small set of army deserters who have now started an armed campaign against the regime).
What is missing, more often than not, is the overwhelming majority of Syrians working at the grassroots against the regime and linked
to neither the Council nor the Army.
Meanwhile, the GCC states leading calls for international pressure to oust Asad are hardly themselves bulwarks of democracy. Their aim
is not to favor democracy over authoritarianism, but rather to topple a largely ‘Alawi (and hence, in their view, Shi‘i) regime allied with
Iran. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and their allies appear to be hoping that a successor regime in Damascus would be predominantly Sunni,
indebted to the GCC states and no longer an ally of Iran or Hizballah. Their motivations, in short, seem more in line with those of the
new Arab cold war than with the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people. With Iran and Hizballah backing the Asad regime, and the
GCC states and Turkey actively opposing it, the Syrian con ict is already becoming a regional con ict. As the United States, Britain and
France call for action through the UN Security Council, blocked only by rival imperial powers Russia and China, the Syrian crisis has
assumed international dimensions as well.
Still, despite the usual level of disarray and rivalry associated with inter-Arab relations, the Arab League — led by Qatar and the GCC
states — did manage to create a semblance of unity as it attempted to craft a way out of the Syria crisis. While not calling for military
intervention, the Arab League proposal called for Asad to cede power to his vice president, paving the way for a negotiated end to the
 ghting and the creation of a Syrian unity government. The Russian and Chinese veto of the Arab League proposal in the Security
Council, however, ensures that the Syrian con ict will become more violent and more internationalized, as the Asad regime attempts to
crush the rebellion once and for all, Syrian resistance groups turn increasingly to armed struggle, and Arab states and others intervene
in other ways — supplying arms, materiel and  nancial support to their chosen side.
The battle lines outside Syria are already drawn, with the US, Britain and France in con ict with Russia and China, while regional non-
Arab powers Turkey and Iran similarly back opposite sides. Israelis are torn between which outcome is worse for them, while Arab
neighbor Jordan is perhaps in the weakest and most dangerous position of all, wedged between Baathist Syria and the GCC, and deeply
vulnerable to the instability engul ng its northern neighbor.
The struggles of the earlier Arab cold war were particularly virulent in Syria, from independence in 1946 to the coup d’etat that
established the authoritarian regime of Ha z al-Asad in 1970. As both Kerr and Seale demonstrated, Syria during those years was a key
battleground in regional struggles between republicans and monarchists, among nationalists, communists and Baathists, and between
global superpowers. Coup after coup toppled governments in Damascus as rival civilian political parties and military o cers
maneuvered against one another, aided and abetted by local and global cold war dynamics. Today, if anything, the dynamics seem even
worse, as external powers including the GCC, the Arab League, Iran, Israel, Turkey, the United States, Britain, France, Russia and even
China spar over Syria’s future. A plunge into full-scale civil war would be all too reminiscent of Lebanon (from 1975 to 1990) or Iraq (after
the 2003 US invasion). A negotiated diplomatic solution stipulating some level of regime change and a more inclusive government —
one that ousts Asad but manages to allay the fears of ‘Alawis, Christians and Muslims alike — seems essential to avoid a similar endemic
con ict in Syria. While much will depend on the e orts of Syrians themselves, today, as in the earlier cold war period, much will also
depend on the cooperation—or rivalry—associated with external Arab, regional and global powers. Indeed, if Syria is allowed to tip into
the abyss, there could be a disaster comparable to Lebanon’s or Iraq’s, as the struggle for Syria once again widens the  ssures of an
Arab cold war, the dynamics of which may doom the hopes of the Syrian people.
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